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THE CRISIS OF PRIVATE LAW IS NOT AN
IDEAL SITUATION
Kenneth Casebeer*
Professor Alan Brudner's paper presents an extraordinarily detailed explication of the Philosophyof Right in terms of contemporary
private law jurisprudence.I I admire and would adopt his superb deployment of Hegel as critique of the incoherence and instability of
libertarian justifications of the morality and content of rights, and of
liberal-Kantian views of public good in tension with pluralism. I do
not intend to follow him through the briars of Hegel's paragraphs;
rather, I will take issue with the aims of his paper and the claims
made for his results.
Professor Brudner intends to show how Hegel's definition of the
good as self-realization assumes and subordinates an understanding of
individual rights, generating both negative rights of noninterference
and positive duties of mutual care.2 Further, it turns out that the
public version of this good appears dialectically in the constitutive
individual wills which manifest their freedom in the form of correctly
understood contemporary North American private law doctrine. 3
This happy circumstance solves the current conceptual crises wrongly
imposed on private law, restoring the autonomy of its discourse. According to Professor Brudner, these crises are first, the reduction of
doctrine to surface rhetoric built on the ideology of microeconomics,
and second, the indeterminacy of case law demonstrated by Critical
Legal Theory which is caused by a continuous shifting between the
opposed goods of self-interest and community welfare. These arguments represent conceptual crises for private law-in the first instance
by removing law's conceptual autonomy, in the second instance by
rendering law morally incoherent, and in both instances by destroying
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. A.B., 1971, Georgetown University; J.D., 1974, Harvard University Law School.
I Brudner, Hegel and the Crisis of Private Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 949 (1989)
2 See id. at 975:
The right to self-determination implies a right to the goods needed by everyone to
ensure that action realizes self-chosen projects. Conversely, welfare becomes the
object of moral concern not as the satisfaction of contingent preferences but as the
realization in each individual of the human capacity for intentional action. This
synthesis of welfare and abstract right Hegel calls the good.
3 "Hegel's philosophy of private law seems to account for the evolution of common-law
rights of welfare in a way that coherently preserves the transactional basis of private law." Id.
at 998.
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the separation of law and political choice necessary to justify and
guide neutral adjudication.
The important question is not whether Professor Brudner's argument adequately represents Hegel, but whether contemporary Hegelian analysis can and should adopt these positions. Professor
Brudner's enterprise is Hegelist. He argues that Hegel in some sense
anticipates and legitimates the contemporary evolution of private law
doctrines. Yet a Hegelist position need not, and should not, be congruent with Hegelian ideas and agendas. 4 I argue that the legal theory we have been offered (by Professor Brudner) is not the legal
theory we need. Therefore, the quest for the legitimation of private
law as the archetype of law is a mistaken and harmful Hegelian
enterprise. 5
I will make three arguments: First, the proposed resolution of the
conceptual crises in private law assumes an individualist will that
searches for confirmation in exchange. This assumption is counterfactual to the modem human condition of interdependence. Thus,
while it may be true that Hegel locates reciprocity in contract, contemporary notions of mutual constitution cannot be so restricted.6
Second, since the crises of private law are a set of crises rooted in the
material conditions of society, they cannot be resolved in ideal terms.
Third, the separation of law and politics necessary to preserve adjudicative neutrality cannot be maintained either as a matter of form-the
limitation of bilateral disputes based on legalized relations-or as a
matter of substance-the opposition of public and private realms of
self-realization. Thus, all three arguments can be stated as "Neo-Hegelian" objections to the Brudner/Hegel justification of private law.
I will develop these arguments in reverse order and in service of a
quite different, modernist worldview than Professor Brudner's. In
capsule, this view holds that the legal theory we need should respond
to the modem, human condition of an artificially constructed social
life, in which, in principle, the world can be explained in innumerable
ways. The tendency to radical subjectivity in such a world negates
4 This form of distinction is more explicit and familiar between Marxist and Marxian
arguments. To the extent some marxian terminology employed in the Comment calls for further reference, see T. Bottomore, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (1983).
S This Comment is generally directed at many of the papers presented at the Hegel and
Legal Theory Symposium, particularly those of Professors Weinrib and Benson. See Benson,
Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and
Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1077 (1989); Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1283 (1989). For a fuller development of this criticism, see Hyland, Hegel: A User's Manual, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1735 (1989).
6 For an example of a nontransactions-based notion of such Hegelian constitution, see
Casebeer, Work on a Labor Theory of Meaning, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1639 (1989).
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itself in the recognition of selves in mutual interdependence of meaning and of material conditions. Further, given such mutuality, the
production of meaning or knowledge under circumstances of action
no different from the production of material conditions destroys the
ability to separate civil society from the realm of politics, and thus the
ability to save the judges from responsibility for their own subjectivity. Under such assumptions, judges must either assume a duty to
emancipate the individual from legal forms of alienation or abdicate
their claims to legitimate social practices through adjudication.
I.

LEGAL POLITICS

Professor Brudner begins his paper by lamenting the standard
postdepression publicization of the contract or exchange basis of private law-for example, strict liability and socialization of risk in tort
law, unconscionability and mistake in contract law, and public welfare easements on property rights of various kinds. Publicization destroys the distinctiveness of private law discourse which appeals
"exclusively to a commonality between persons who recognize no
good or end as uniformly theirs, and whose interactions are therefore
those of self-interested monads." 7 It is precisely this bleeding of public good or distributional concerns of the welfare state into actualization of private will, that destroys the ability of judges to avoid
political choices in private law or to believe that adjudication can be
limited to a test of bilateral interests. Professor Brudner blames this
development on the conceptually doomed attempt to begin legal argument with an understanding of the public good, whose purpose is to
ground a morality of private right-which in turn can account for a
communal regard for the rights of other's formally equivalent opportunities.
The public good argument attempts to prevent a collapse of social behavior into the war of "all against all," or the subordination of
natural rights into the interests of the stronger, which a purely individualized self-regarding moral system eventually produces. While
laudable in intent, the resulting conceptual problem is the instability
of the system's teleology. The relation of the independently defined
public good to the interests of the rights holders continuously vacilates between public and private interest. Worst of all, according to
Professor Brudner, "instrumentalist theories of law, while entirely
comfortable with legal doctrines imposing positive duties of social responsibility, have no principled means of stopping them from bursting
7 Brudner, supra note 1, at 950.
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the transactional framework of private law."' Professor Brudner,
however, believes a more adequate notion of public good-that is,
self-realization---can subordinate a notion of individual rights manifest in transactions under the shadow of a private law, in which the
good never appears but is known by its necessary absence. In this
way, positive duties of regard for the projects of others exist insofar as
transactions are promoted, but stop short of requiring the sacrifice of
ones own programs for the pure benefit of another or an amorphous
community. Thus, while under present doctrine the publicized notions of mistake or unconscionability fail to gain stability and are extended in tension with transactional norms, Professor Brudner's
reprivatized notions claim to escape both consequences.9
Initially, as a description of the present state of private law discourse, notice that Professor Brudner has created precisely the same
straw figure as some critical legal scholars, who have been content just
to demonstrate the indeterminacy of the public-private distinction. 10
The dominant liberal legal theory centers on the separation of a universal citizenship in the shared sphere of public good from the personal maximization of private interest. However, both the critics and
the target share the identity implied in their combined assumptions.
Whether the aim is Professor Brudner's depiction of a contaminated
private law, or the critical theorists' demonstration of the dependence
of private interests on public legitimation and subsidy, the public-private distinction is also a necessary fiction. Professor Brudner wishes
to reestablish the separation of civil society from the political state on
a nonliberal basis, whereas some critical legal arguments aim to redefine or politicize it. Both, however, conceptually depend on the meaningfulness of the public-private distinction as that by which their
argument is known.
8 Id. at 997.

9 See id. at 999:
From the perspective of Hegel's thought, these principles (of self-determination]
represent, not a break with contract, but rather the bringing closer to its own notion of an institution whose initial shape contradicted the project it was intended to
realize. That is to say, the enforcement of these principles actualizes the self-determination of the agent by revoking on various fronts the alienation of self that was
sanctioned under the regime of abstract right. Such an enterprise in no way entails
the subordination of contract to amorphous considerations of communal solidarity, for rights of intentionality, no less than the formal rights they subsume, actualize the causality of the individual agent.
10 See id. at 949 n.2, 955 n.22. For criticism of indeterminacy, see Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of Legal Explanation, 6 Cardozo L.
Rev. 917 (1985). Like all glib reductions, this tendency has few specific examples. Traces of
the position may be found in A Symposium-The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1289 (1982).
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In making my third argument, that law and politics cannot be
separated, I argue that both Professor Brudner and some critical theorists have identified a surface rhetoric, or conventional wisdom, as the
critic's target or the obstacle to a regained purity. What appears as
impurities in the system or indeterminacy, however, defines only a
rhetorical surface of legal relations. This is not to suggest that legal
reasoning is in fact determinate or can be made so, but rather that
locating the source of indeterminacy in the public-private distinction
is mistaken because such criticism yields-and lends credibility toreform attempts along the lines of Professor Brudner's. To the contrary, structuring the relational surface is the rationalizing of an underlying social structure or structures. Rather than a public-private
distinction, contemporary law already embodies a private-public
unity serving as a discursive arena in the reproduction of a particular
social type-the capitalist democracy. To be clear, social conflict over
the structuralization of such a society appears derivatively in the social relations articulated in the legal surface. However, these indeterminacies are known and bounded by their appropriateness to the
struggle constructing the particular social type. If this conceptual
unity, perhaps one of many, beneath the surface of doctrinal rhetoric
can be illustrated, a bounded indeterminacy is reestablished. First,
even if Hegel's self-realization could provide a determinate idealization of transactional autonomy, judges would still choose between
that autonomy and the autonomy of a private-public unity in the service of reproducing a particular social type; hardly an idealized project, and certainly political.
The indeterminacy of private interest and communal good would
simply have been replaced by the indeterminacy of self-realization
within a civil society separated from the state by which it is known,
which is Professor Brudner's position, versus the reproduction of capitalist organization within the state. Indeterminacy and the politics of
legal reasoning are just kicked upstairs. Second, since the autonomy
of private law depends on a reinvention of its determinacy, competing
visions of private law which supercede the conceptual stage of public
good priority over libertarian private interest suggest a third alternative possibility of self-realization knowing itself in a mutuality outside
private bilateral transactions. Autonomy of discourse at a higher
level of abstraction does not necessarily reduce the politics of competing visions of free action.
Regarding the first objection, American work law11 illustrates
11 By "work law" I am referring to all of the doctrine related to the employment of individuals, not simply doctrine dealing with collective bargaining.
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the present unity of private and public interest-a unity which both
predates and postdates the so-called sea change in the publicization of
American law during and following the 1930s, and therefore cannot
be explained by that change. Further, if only the relational surface of
law-which is doctrine--changes, but not the normative functional
connection between the social meaning embedded in the conceptual
structure of law and the social actions constituting the history of a
particular society, two additional results are implied: First, if doctrinal analysis remains relational then political opposition to present law
is rendered legally more manageable. Whether the reform of liberal
legal doctrine stems from an ideology of rights or communal good,
the seduction in the legal surface of social relations promises to subsume the reform in new indeterminacies of relational rhetoric. Second, the contribution of legal consciousness to repressive conditions is
underestimated by a double mask: First, the liberal public good-private right distinction is too easy a target. Its deconstruction is like
exploding a barrage balloon, insofar as few employers deny that the
public subsidy of private investment represents a public sphere defined by competition of interests for the imprimatur of common good.
Second, the linkage of legal-social relations and self-realization as the
fulcrum of change ignores the barriers to reconceiving social relations
absent social control over the construction of power which appears as
the conceptualized social structure antecedent to selves in relation.
This is important because the dialectical surface opposition of private
and public, or civil society and state, by failing to explain its own
deeper consciousness prevents a reimagination of the actual opposition of individual and social wills.
To proceed, it is first necessary to define the difference between
the relational surface defined by the liberal public-private distinction
and the underlying structure of legal consciousness defined by a private-public unity.12 The modem American constitutional law scholar
uses Coppage v. Kansas 13 or Lochner v. New York 14 as the classic
statement of the public-private distinction-that is, the model of an
airtight separation of private law and public law. Professor Brudner
describes this argument as the libertarian or private-rights generated
morality attacked by Hegel's critique. The Coppage of the casebooks
stands for the premises of the traditional liberal political system:
(1) Personal liberty and property should be pursued within the self12 For a more detailed initial development of this argument, see Casebeer, Teaching an Old
Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas and At-Will Employment Revisited, 6 Cardozo L. Rev.
765, 768-783 (1985).
13 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
14 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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interested control and alienation consistent with preserving a like liberty for all, (2) public interferences with private resource allocation
through contract are therefore the minimum interventions necessary
to preserve like liberty for all and constitute the duties of universal
citizenship, and (3) it is perverse to suppose that a deployment of public rules would aim at redistribution of privately acquired property
interests.
In fact, Justice Pitney in Coppage structures his reasoning quite
differently. The nature of his social vision revolves around four different premises which define natural social relations as the quintessential
at-will employment contract. In this type of employment relationship, each side is and should be free to quit at any time for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. I5 Pitney's four premises define
two pairs, each with an economic and a legal content. The microrelation pair holds: (1) Each side of a social relation must be permitted the maximum mobility of their labor and their capital (the economic principle of free labor) and (2) Maximum mobility is preserved
by legal enforcement of contracts of mutuality of obligation. This is
the legal recognition of the first principle. The macro-social interest
pair holds: (3) The public interest lies in maximized production at
minimal cost, which occurs by private exchange organization of social
relations and yields maximum consumption (the economic principle
of a consumption oriented division of labor) and (4) Strict enforcement of the mutual and express obligations of contract is distributionally neutral, given and in service of social interest. This is the legal
recognition of the first and third principles. There is nothing of universal citizenship driving this social vision, and no public-private distinction. The public interest is simply derivative of aggregate or
generalized private interest, and civil society does not represent a separate sphere in which the individual will manifests its partiality from
the universal.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, a supposed precursor of the modem sea
change of constitutional law, and therefore all doctrinal categories defined by the public-private distinction, dissented from the Massachusetts bench in 1896 in Vegelahn v. Guntner, a union civil conspiracy
case, writing: "One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made
up is that between the effort of every man to get the most he can for
his services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital,
15 On the origin of the at-will discharge rule, see H.G. Wood, A Treatise on the Law of
Master and Servant 157-58 (1877 & photo. reprint 1981); Payne v. Western & Atd. R.R., 81
Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled, 179 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
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to get his services for the least possible return."16 Understood in this
way, Holmes's celebrated Lochner dissent does not argue for an independent public good from which to critique the avarice of private
right, but rather the recognition that the private-public unity can be
equally pursued through individual contract, collective contract, or
via voting interests, that is, through social contract. Thus, the
landmark of the constitutional change, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, I7 defines less the primacy of the good over the right-Professor
Brudner's source of modem private doctrine impurities-but rather
the extension of Holmes's version of Coppage.
West CoastHotel begins with public good rhetoric: "[T]he liberty
safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the people.... [R]egulation which is reasonable
in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.""8 Although this seems to document Professor
Brudner's case, the key question of community interest translates into
the extension of private interest-specifically, that employers should
not exploit the temporary oversupply in the labor market to drive
wages below the "bare cost of living," that is, the cost of reproducing
the labor supply:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental
to their health and well being but casts a direct burden for their
support upon the community.... The community is not bound to

provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.19
The problem with some rogue employers is that by physical or economic force they coerce bargains inconsistent with free labor and free
capital mobility, destroy mutuality, and interfere with the long term
ability to organize an exchange relation division of labor for maximized social consumption. ° What we have is less a sea change than
the same conceptual private-public unity of Coppage. Thus, constitutional law does not provide a clear source of public-good values to
infuse into private transactional law. Further, even this derivative
public good fails to make the same mark in work law that it seemingly
16 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 104 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
17 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
18 Id. at 391.
19

20

Id. at 399.
C.B. MacPherson, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism 194-262 (1962).
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does in the context of unconscionability and mistake within contract
doctrines for sales of goods.
Contract doctrine is now less contract doctrine with a capital C,
than a set of contract doctrines memorialized, for example, in the different articles of the Uniform Commercial Code translating the separate customs of the different product and service markets into
separate doctrines. Yet, the contemporary work law continues to reject the Restatement of Contracts in employment contracts, rejects
strict liability, and maintains various discarded assumption of risk
doctrines in torts involving work and workers. The law of work, no
matter what assumptions are conveyed by first-year law school curricula, is simply not a law of contracts or torts or property simpliciter.
Moreover, work law's basic doctrines continue virtually unscathed
before and after the supposed publicization revolution. This must
prove an embarrassment to any Hegelist argument which attempts to
gain currency by fitting contemporary private law.2 1 First, there is
more than one private law of transactions. Second, the difference is
not explained by the differential or partial acceptance of various arguments of public good overriding libertarian right.
A prominent example of the difference between contracts for
goods and labor concerns the interpretation of permanent employment contracts or contracts for life. Section 79 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts is basic first-year law-"If the requirement of
consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of a) a gain
...to the promisor or ...detriment to the promisee; b) equivalence in
the values exchanged, or c) mutuality of obligation. '' 22 Yet, a permanent employment contract is indefinite and therefore at-will unless all
three banished elements are present. From Rape v. Mobile & Ohio
Rail Co. in 1924:
It may be said to be the established rule that want of mutuality of
obligation will not render a contract of employment unenforceable
if it is supported by an independent consideration, that is, a consideration other than the obligation of service to be performed on the
one hand and wages to be paid on the other; but we think the correct rule... is that a contract for permanent employment which is
not supported by such independent consideration is terminable at
21 At times it is unclear whether Professor Brudner's normative argument depends upon
vindicating the evolution of modem private law from classic private law. However, the example of work law at least destroys a determinate evolution of private law even if Professor
Brudner's reconceptualization is not dependent on fitting any particular version of private law.
It seems quite clear that this example greatly damages the argument of Professor Benson. See
Benson, supra note 5.
22 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79 (1981).
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the pleasure of either party.2 3

Despite the constitutional revolution and the accompanying publicization of commercial contracts, the post- West Coast Hotel perma24
nent employment rule has remained unchanged.
What is to be made of this bifurcation in contract law? Professor
Brudner might argue that this example shows only that the priority of
the good over the right displaces the libertarian collapse gradually
and imperfectly, and fails to provide a determinate solution to social
conflicts across differing relational conflicts.
Professor Brudner's argument is an unlikely explanation for two
reasons. The first is because of the uniformity of doctrinal divergence
between contracts of work and contracts for goods. Once legal theory
in Professor Brudner's terms has evolved a publicization of contracts
for goods, the sphere of contracts for work which has been systematically left untouched must be known by virtue of the role of contracts
of work within a new legal totality: synthesis cannot return to past
thesis. Contracts for goods are enforced largely with the welfare and
consumer interest overrides characterized by contemporary "public"
law, While contracts for work reject this form of public interest. Work
law rejects any public, prescriptive property right of easement in a
particular job based on seniority or implied investment.25 Work law
preserves assumption of risk defenses on the theory that wages include risk compensation-sometimes even in states whose comparative fault system has rejected assumption of risk in all other tort
settings. 6 Work law constructs postdepression federal regulations of
employment such as minimum wage, collective bargaining, and unemployment compensation, not to cover employees as the class of individuals necessary to accomplish the benefit defined by an
independent public good, but rather to cover those employees who are
not independent contractors.
Federal regulation of employment maintains and facilitates private organization of work by either distinguishing between workers
who provide wealth for themselves under the conditions of risk from
workers who produce wealth for others, 27 or by regulating rogue employers whose discrimination disrupts the mobility. of the labor pool. 2
Even the so-called revolution of individual employment contract-the
23 Rape v. Mobile & Ohio Rail Co., 136 Miss. 38, 42-43, 100 So. 585, 588 (1924).
24 See, e.g., United Sec. Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 281 Ala. 264, 201 So. 2d 853 (1967).
25 Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927

(1969).
26 George v. Beggs., 1 Kan. App. 2d 356, 564 P.2d 593 (1977).
27 NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs, 702 F.2d 912 (1983).
28 Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (1979).
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public policy exception to at-will discharge, supports this singularity.

With the aberrant exception of California, jurisdictions which have
adopted public policy exceptions, first, generally sound the action in
contract, limiting damages; second, limit the exception to the rogue
employers whose personal abuse of workers reduce the social benefit
of maximum production, or who cover-up illegal activity; and third,
retreat from broad public policies as soon as they are established to a
position consistent with maximum mobility of free labor and free capital, at best including Holmes's long range view of efficient labor markets. 29 Moreover, the perpetuation of the at-will contract as the
primary legalization of the employment relation is facilitated by removing the need for employers to protect themselves, contractually,
against fluctuations in the labor market. This is done by publicly
gearing the eligibility standards of unemployment compensation to
changing skill needs in relation to a reserve labor pool, and by the
advantage of the at-will contract in a segmented labor market in
which secondary and tertiary labor pools are increasingly satisfactory
to the division of labor inside the firm. a0
The second reason Professor Brudner will find the partial transition from right to good based norms unsatisfactory to explain the
divergence in contract law, is that the indeterminacy of surface or
relational rhetoric in work doctrine-or between work and goods
contracts-is itself structured as a manifestation in legal consciousness of social structure. Legalization of the division of labor necessarily assumes the insulation of the legality of investment decisions from
employment relations. To the extent that legal discourse is semiautonomous, this is what actually represents the conceptual autonomy "private law" never lost. With the reproduction of a particular
social type, differences in the organization of transactions is contingent and derivative of social and political practices. Thus, the partial
infection of the law of exchange relations is not random or lagging,
but is related to differences in market structures organizing social resources. Justice Lewis Powell in InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. Daniel explicitly rejects the possibility that the legal regime of
public interest in capital forms applies to employee interests despite
the fact that pension plans possess every element of a security:
29 See Casebeer, supra note 12, at 784-89.
30 "The development and preservation of worker skills and the advancement and utilization of employee training are of general public concern.... Employment which may be unsuit-

able in a period of full employment may be suitable in a period of depression or of falling
wages." Dubkowski v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 150 Conn. 278,
282-83, 188 A.2d 658, 660 (1963) (quoting Pacific Mills v. Director of Div. of Employment
Sec., 322 Mass. 345, 350, 77 N.E.2d 413, 416 (1948)).
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Only in the most abstract sense may it be said that an employee
"exchanges" some portion of his labor in return for these possible
benefits. He surrenders his labor as a whole, and in return receives
a compensation package that is substantially devoid of aspects resembling a security. His decision to accept and retain covered employment may have only an attenuated relationship, if any, to
perceived investment possibilities of a future pension. Looking at
the economic realities, it seems clear that an employee is selling his
labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment.3 1
The conceptual need to separate investment from employment
relations 32 not only structures the indeterminacy of employment relations between time frames of interest maximization, but also does so
in a way in which Hegel's and Brudner's grounding of the moral good
in self-realization is irrelevant. The realization of the self takes the
form of contract but the content of the common will is the agency of
multiple social roles. Professor Brudner claims:
In contrast [to the indeterminacy of the liberal public-private distinction], a theory of justice that offers a dialectical synthesis of
private right and public good will reveal the inner unity of classical
and modern phases of the common law, and will thus advance the
most persuasive claim to be the law's indwelling and original principle. . . . [Hegel] provides the only possible response to those
who assert33 a fundamental indeterminacy at the heart of legal
reasoning.

Professor Brudner's unity derives private right from a universe of selfrealization, ordering the self's relation to the partial projects of other
selves. Yet, the unity which appears in work law orders public good
as the extension of a social structure of private power, which is conceptually prior to relational forms of action. Further, the common
good of work law already appropriates the "property, talents, and energies of the agent" in the appearance of mutuality of right to realize
self-interest.3 4 This appearance of mutuality in the mobility of labor
and capital, however, is subordinate to a legalized division of labor
which requires the differentiation of social roles. Inform, this is precisely the subordination of the right to the good in the appearanceof
right independent of the good, which is Professor Brudner's goal for a
reautonomized private law. Rather than a law of transactions which
embodies the "concealment of the priority of the good that is required
439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979).
See J. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (1983).
33 Brudner, supra note 1, at 955.
34 Id. at 983.
31

32
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by the objective realization of the good itself,""a a private law unified
by the hidden good, the unity of classic and modem phases of common law actually subordinates the good by a hidden private empowerment of management of investment.
The idea that the good subordinates an ideal of right, which demands mutual respect and some positive regard for the realization of
the projects of others in the legitimation of the self's partiality, does
not, and cannot, stabilize incompatibilities generated by the employer's dual interest in minimizing the short term costs of the wage
bargain, as against contributing to the long term shared social interest
in structuring the system of investments to support maximum consumption. Mutual regard for the contract interests of both sides of
the wage bargain must be discounted by the discipline of the investor's need to lower production costs. On the other hand, the employee is torn between the citizen's interest in consumption which
internalizes the costs and risks of the labor factor of production into
wages, limits the legally cognizable interest of workers to monetized
wages, and minimizes interest in the wages of others; all in opposition
to the worker's producer interest in the personal return on labor. In
no other exchange context does consumption or use value cut against
production value. What appears as an unsolvable indeterminacy between contract doctrines for goods and contract doctrines for labor,
from the standpoint of both the Hegelian good and the liberal publicprivate distinction, is thus conceptually structured by the investment/
employment dichotomy in service of private-public unity. Because
this indeterminacy stems from the interpenetration of civil society and
state, its manifestation in the surface rhetoric of private law does not
reduce to the opposition of libertarian entitlement and the public good
of wealth maximization. This indeterminacy thus shares with Hegel's
argument a conceptually more advanced stage than either private
right or its public good successor .3 6 This is a distributional indeterminacy independent of the morality of individual or relational goals
because it is specific to a particular historical form of social organization.
II.

MATERIAL ROOTS OF PRIVATE CRISES

My second argument locates this conflict simultaneously in material and ideal conditions. Professor Joel Rogers has demonstrated
35 Id. at 994.

Compare Epstein, in id. at 950 n.8 with Paul, Searching for the Status Quo (Book Review), 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 743 (1986) (reviewing R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain (1985)).
36
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that post-war collective bargaining law reinforces institutional practices which, while locally rational for workers, also subjects groups of
workers to prisoner's dilemmas, which in the aggregate decrease the
social power of labor.37 Professor Rogers demonstrates that this is
typical of social organization under capitalist democracies. For the
same reasons the structure of such democracies creates material divisions which render the opposition and mediation of the interests of
investors and workers-a perpetual dilemma. They can neither be
merely contractors, nor both workers or both investors, and are thus
denied the universal commonality Professor Brudner must find to
regenerate a determinate private law of self-realization to which individual wills are motivated. This separation of investment and employment divides the system of production (labor time) from
distribution (use values), and divides the direction or end of the division of labor (consumption) from the reproduction of social life. Both
divisions are accomplished by preventing control of society's resources from depending on the process of specific decisions regulating
the allocation of jobs to workers, and by definition separating such
resource decisions from democratic processes of welfare determination and social wage. Therefore, the indeterminacies which Hegel's
civil society cannot overcome when located in modem welfare states
are material and not simply ideal. Such indeterminacies of opposed
interests, of course, are not limited to the relations of the labor pool
and labor market. Other social structures such as the family, or communities of religion or spirituality, undoubtedly manifest their material reproduction in similar conceptual structures and relational
surfaces in part organized by the state, complicating the relationship
of the realization of individual partiality and universal or conceptual
totality.
The relations of historical individuals imbricated in the modem
form of the state partially constitutes .the commonality of individuals.
Once economic structure and the structure of legal consciousness
simultaneously, but not derivatively, codetermine each other, the
boundary of law and politics which for Hegel allowed the universal
will to know itself as the partial interests of self-realization in civil
society, disappears. For us, the freedom of the law constitutes itself in
dominant and repressed wills captured in conflicting legal relations,
then synthesized in social realization. Professor Brudner cannot acknowledge this content of law because Professor Brudner, following
Hegel, needs the good to subordinate private interest. To him, the
37 J. Rogers, Divide and Conquer: The Legal Foundation of Postwar U.S. Labor Policy
(doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1984).

NOT AN IDEAL SITUATION

1989]

1015

"universal good was conceived precisely by abstraction from material
content," and "there is no possibility.., of an immanent specification
from the good of a content adequate to its universal form. A will
whose essence is to be devoid of content cannot spontaneously determine itself without self-negation." 3 On the other hand, a will need
not be devoid of content if the good of self-realization is grounded in
the emancipation of material interests from the hierarchic private
control that prevents integration of work and self. Work and self remain literally alienated in a transactional world.
Overcoming the self-estrangement of self-alienation should become the Hegelian project. This would be especially true if the production of ideas and social meaning were thought to be no different in
principle from the production of material conditions. It seems unlikely that Professor Brudner would disagree. On the contrary, a contrasting of meaning and conditions, and thus the ability to separate a
sphere of morally authentic conduct from which to criticize unalloyed
self-interest either in material acquisition or in strategic argument, depends on a criterion of truth seemingly stronger than coherence or
pragmatism. Truth must rather consist of the correspondence of a
form of realism. Such a belief seems unlikely when coupled with modernity's assumption of socially constructed meaning. 39 Even the familiar resort to dialogism or communicative rationality as a moral
standpoint within a constructed reality, seems inapposite to the kind
of self-realization which Professor Brudner has in mind. First, any
communicative rationality opposed to material conditions and relations seems difficult to sustain in stronger than an aspirational sense.
How do strategic actors recognize a nonstrategic rationality in other
than conventional terms? Second, conventions would seem to be the
only sense in which Professor Brudner means for the good of selfrealization to provide a positive duty of minimal regard for the
projects of others in a transactional world. That is, we should treat
the individual particularity of wills with respect and support when not
inconsistent with our own. His mutual recognition is only recognition
of an equal opportunity of self interest.
III.

INTERDEPENDENCE NOT EXCHANGE

The construction of social meaning leads to the third argument
against the regeneration of private law-the counterfactual nature of
individualized experience. Professor Brudner also aims at an under38 Brudner, supra note 1, at 984.
39 See, e.g., Taylor, Overcoming Epistemology, in After Philosophy: End or Transformation 459 (K. Baynes, J. Bohman & T. McCarthy eds. 1987).
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standing of the individual that breaks the finitude of the atomistic self,
but fails to recognize that self-consciousness has already set itself
against an empirical reality that denies the opposition of individual
and community. "The standard of right is the actualization of the
causality of this concept [that each sees in the other, not an indifferent
or hostile object, but its own confirmation and support]." 40 If the empirical reality, captured in private law, has already burst the bounds
of transaction-conceptualized independently of political organization-the concrete individual agent who asserts herself represents the
self already and imperfectly mutual. Many contemporary accounts of
communicative rationality such as those of Professors Drucilla Cornell 41 and Seyla Benhabib4 2 describe the experience of decentralized
or interdependent subjects who recognize the mutual constitution of
the self in the constitution of the other. Thus, the familiar interdependence of material conditions in modem society suggests an interdependence in the construction of social meaning as well. Under such
circumstances, the partiality of individual wills continues to point in
the direction of self-realization, but not within a civil society "of selfinterested monads" manifest in private law.
Professor Brudner is partially correct in seeking a legal discourse
"no longer based on the presumed reality of a natural will unmediated
by self consciousness; rather, it is now rooted in the inward and rational articulation of self-consciousness itself, in the conceptual requirements of freedom. ' 43 He is right to seek self-consciousness in
mutual constitution." However, he is partly wrong in seeking such a
discourse in an autonomous private law. 45 It is possible to agree with
Professor Brudner that the judge's duty in addition to enforcing rights
40 Brudner, supra note 1, at 987.

41 Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique of Employment at Will, 10 Cardozo L.
Rev 1575 (1989).
42 S. Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (1986).

43 Brudner, supra note 1, at 993.
4

Id. at 991:

Consequently, the person's activity will consist in confirming his certainty of final
worth by receiving it back from another self whose finality and hence validating
power he reciprocally constitutes. This activity will belie the presumed naturalness of the atomistic individual as well as the connected claim to self-sufficiency of
abstract personality. The latter will be revealed as requiring confirmation of its
finality through the mutual self-renunciation of empirical individuals in contract.
45 Id.:
Accordingly, instead of dissolving private law in a monochrome and static idea of
community, philosophy will reveal community in the determinate (that is, legal
and abstract) shape peculiar to persons who spurn community, thereby simultaneously reclaiming the state of nature for the Idea and explicating private law from
its own point of view.
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of personal security and the externalization of the person's work, includes a positive right to that externalization against the egoistic indifference of other agents. "[T]hat courts view private law as the set of
conditions under which the intentionality of one agent may be reconciled with the intentionality of another under a universal law."' 46 The
mistake in Professor Brudner's argument is to assume that the intentionality and the causality of the agent remains atomistic rather than
decentralized or interdependent. For this reason the judge must be
directed -neither by abstract right nor abstract community, but by actual connectedness. The moral integration of personality strives to
overcome the self-estrangement of pure manipulation, by overcoming
the alienation of the self demanded by the investment-employment
dichotomy of capitalist-democracy. Such integration opposes the inauthenticity of a self attempting to will itself in isolation or contrast to
the other. The motive of the self is authentic recognition of the self.
That legalized versions of the self in activity will continue to have the
appearance of the individual does not require private transactional
law. Free action requires reconstruction of a consciousness of social
experience which is capable of becoming continuously less false than
any predecessor to the modern human condition of inescapable interdependence in material conditions and social construction. Given
such interdependence, reconstruction demands the equal warrant of
each to understand, that is participate, in the continuous explanation
of those conditions. 47 Adjudication oriented to the actual equal warrant of participation represents a coherent role of law, if not a determinate content. This type of adjudication thus incorporates a critical
perspective within right, without depending on the static oppositions
of individual and community which Professor Brudner claims criticism presupposes. 48
The experience of democracy in a form capable of overcoming
alienation or self-estrangement, makes salient an expressivist or labor
oriented social being. The other needs to be reduced to property only
in a society of individual monads. It is true that the other is reduced
to an object of labor in the mutual construction of meaning. However, at the same time this labor is also the externalization of the self
46
47
48

Id. at 70.
For a more developed exposition of this argument, see Casebeer, supra note 12.
Brudner, supra note 1, at 986:
What this [critical] consciousness fails to see is that radical indeterminacy was the
result of a particular way of conceptualizing the good. Specifically, it was the result of conceiving the good in such a way as to exclude from its essence the very
action and knowledge of the individual agent upon which it depended for selfconfirmation.
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in mutuality, whereas transactions confirm mutuality only by abandonment or alienation. The political individual whose actions constitute interdependence gains mutuality in the further act of strategy,
and thus gains the self in the negation of the individual interests. But
this is a negation or absence which does not deny the empirical basis
of the individual in the social web. For this reason, the forces of production in their most abstract form constitute an inescapable politics
in the form of the division of labor. An unalienated existence integrates a social experience characterized by the interdependence of
conditions and interaction of persons, and the equal warrant of each
to participate in social construction-which is simply labor.
The legal theory we need now translates the good of self-realization into a mode of social existence which dissolves the separation of
private and public, and more-a self-realization which also accepts
the political character of law, and which understands the division of
labor as inherently political and constitutive of individual partiality.
This partiality perpetuates false consciousness if deflected from its
mutually interdependent nature, and therefore makes of adjudication
an arena of social meaning construction which exposes conflict as
alienation by virtue of immanent critique. Contrary to Professor
Brudner's Hegel, the contemporary Hegelian good of self-realization
thus points the direction pragmatically toward the reproduction of
society under conditions of authentic equal warrant and participation.
In short, the legal theory we need now participatesin an articulation
of the experience of democracy, not transaction.

